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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction in the trial court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Appellant
bases his claims on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (the “Act” or “RLUIPA”) with regard to a
deprivation of his constitutional rights. Summary Judgment was granted to
Defendants on November 30, 2012. JA137. Wall timely filed a Notice of Appeal
from this final order on December 10, 2012. JA148. Therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Whether Wall’s claims for equitable relief under the Act and § 1983 are
moot.

II.

Whether the district court improperly granted summary judgment in the
Defendants’ favor on Wall’s § 1983 claim based on its finding that
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
In 2011, Gary Wall filed his original complaint in this action and
subsequently filed two amended complaints asserting Defendants violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act with
regard to his observation of Ramadan. JA9, JA27. On April 9, 2012, Defendants
moved for summary judgment. JA67. Wall filed his response to that motion,
JA109, and the next day was transferred out of Red Onion State Prison to Wallens
Ridge State Prison. JA135. The district court granted the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, finding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on
the § 1983 claim, and, because of Wall’s transfer from Red Onion, his claims
under the Act were moot. JA137. After the trial court entered judgment, JA147,
Wall timely appealed and filed a motion for reconsideration. JA148. Also, on
December 31, 2012, Wall was transferred back to Red Onion and filed a second
motion for reconsideration. JA150, JA154. On March 7, 2013, the district court
denied both motions for reconsideration, and this appeal proceeded. JA157.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gary Wall is a state prisoner currently housed at Red Onion State Prison
(“Red Onion”) in Pound, Virginia. Over the course of his incarceration, Wall has
established a history as a member of the Nation of Islam faith. For example, Wall
engaged in and successfully observed Ramadan fasting in 2008 and 2009. JA139.
Additionally, while at Red Onion Wall received common fare meals to
accommodate his religious beliefs. JA139.
A.

The Ramadan List

Around June 2010, inmates at Red Onion were notified that they had until
July 25th to sign up to participate in fasting for the month of Ramadan. JA138.
Wall submitted his form on July 1, 2010 and received a reply from Red Onion
officials saying “You are on the list.” JA138.
After the sign up deadline for Ramadan, Food Service Manager James
Wade, Counselor J. Stallard, and Food Service Supervisor C. Selyers, visited
Wall’s and the other prisoners’ cells in accordance with a new, apparently
unwritten policy at Red Onion. JA138-39. Wade and the others demanded that
each inmate who had requested to participate in Ramadan fasting produce physical
items as proof of the sincerity of their faith. JA138. Unfortunately, as Wall
informed Wade, all his belongings, including articles of his faith, were lost in his
transfer to Red Onion. JA138-39. Wall presented Wade a court order directing a
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monetary judgment in Wall’s favor against the Commonwealth to confirm that his
belonging were lost. JA138-39. Wall also produced documents showing that Wall
was currently receiving common fare meals in accordance with his Nation of Islam
faith. JA138-39. Wall further explained to Wade that he had faithfully observed
the Ramadan fasting in both 2008 and 2009. JA139. Despite these documents and
Wall’s statements concerning his faith, Wade declared “That don’t mean anything
to them,” and told Stallard and Selyers to remove Wall from the Ramadan list.
JA139.
B.

Wall Files Grievances Requesting Permission to Participate In
Ramadan

After being removed from participation by Wade, Stallard, and Selyers, Wall
filed an informal grievance explaining again that his religious materials were lost
and requesting an explanation. JA139. Wade responded by stating that either Wall
did not have items or refused to present them and therefore would remain off the
Ramadan participation list. JA139. Wade did not address Wall’s claims that his
belongings had been lost. JA139. Wall filed another informal grievance a few
days later and received the same response. JA139. As Ramadan began, Wall
attempted to save his breakfast in his cell and eat it after sundown, however, he
was prohibited from saving the food and subject to sanctions for his effort. JA139.
Wall then filed an emergency grievance, but was again rebuffed. JA139-40.
Finally, Wall filed two formal grievances. JA139-40.
-4-
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Rowlette Refuses To Put Wall Back On The Ramadan List

In response to the formal grievances, Assistant Warden Robert Rowlette and
Wade approached Wall to discuss the matter while Wall was in the shower area.
JA30, JA139-40. Rowlette asked if Wall would like to be put back on the
Ramadan list provided that Rowlette could verify that Wall had truly lost his
belongings. JA140. Not having the court disposition with him at the time, Wall
replied that he would like to be put back on the list but that he would also like an
explanation as to why he was removed in the first place. JA140. Rowlette replied
“Okay,” and then walked away while Wall shouted that he wanted to participate in
Ramadan. JA61-62, JA140. Later, Wall received a written response to his formal
grievance signed by Chief Warden Tracy Ray that claimed Wall had responded to
Rowlette’s offer with “No, I will pursue this matter in court.” JA140. Wall
remained unable to participate in Ramadan. JA140. Wall appealed this decision to
the Regional Director John Garman disputing Rowlette’s version of events and his
appeal was denied, citing the same statement as grounds for keeping Wall’s name
off the Ramadan participation list. JA48-49.
D.

Procedural History

As a result, Wall filed suit against Wade, Rowlette, Ray, Stallard, Selyers,
and others, (collectively the “Red Onion Officials” or “Defendants”), for violations
of the Act and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in their official and individual capacities.

-5-

Appeal: 13-6355

Doc: 28

Filed: 05/06/2013

Pg: 14 of 37

JA9, JA27. Wall’s final amended complaint was accepted by the court in
November of 2011. In February, Wall filed and served interrogatories, and
requests for production and requests for admissions. See e.g. JA5-6. The
Defendants sought and were granted a protective order allowing them not to
respond to Wall’s discovery requests. JA6, JA106. The Defendants then filed a
motion for summary judgment and Wall responded. JA67, JA109. Within days of
filing his response to the motion for summary judgment, Wall was transferred out
of Red Onion to another prison. JA135.
The district court, without a hearing, granted the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. JA137. It ruled that Wall’s claims for injunctive relief under
the Act and the First Amendment were moot, because Wall’s transfer to Wallens
Ridge made it impossible for the court to provide equitable relief. In a footnote,
the court stated that even if Wall were transferred back to Red Onion, his claims
would be moot because the policy had been rescinded. JA142 n.12. The district
court also found that Eleventh Amendment immunity protected the Defendants
from monetary relief in their official capacities, and qualified immunity protected
them in their individual capacities. JA144-46. Wall filed a motion for
reconsideration and an appeal. JA7, JA148. During the time immediately
following the case, Wall was transferred back to Red Onion, and filed a second
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motion for reconsideration due to his changed circumstances. JA150, JA154. The
district court summarily denied both motions. JA157. This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should hold that summary judgment was wrongly granted to the
Red Onion Officials, and remand this case for a trial. First and foremost, Wall’s
claims under the Act are not moot. He has been transferred back to Red Onion, so
the principal rationale for the district court’s finding of mootness no longer is
supported by the facts. And the district court erred when, in a footnote, it
determined that Red Onion’s voluntary cessation of its Ramadan policy mooted the
claims for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court and this Court have both held that
when there is a voluntary cessation of a policy, a heavy burden is placed on the
party asserting mootness to prove that there is no reasonable expectation that the
policy will be put back in place or that the infringement of the right will be
repeated. Defendants do not meet that heavy burden here because they have
presented no facts regarding its reason for ending the policy and offer no evidence
to show that the policy will not be reinstated or the wrong will not be repeated.
Under this Court’s precedent, a party asserting mootness by voluntary cessation
must present supporting facts to meet its heavy burden of proving the behavior is
not likely to recur. The Red Onion Officials presented no evidence here. Thus,
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Wall’s request for injunctive relief was not moot and the merits of Wall’s claims
must be addressed.
Additionally, Defendants’ denial of Ramadan meals violates Wall’s First
Amendment free exercise right. Whether Wall’s right to free exercise have been
violated is analyzed under the four factor test articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987). “First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
it.” Id.; see also Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 200 (4th Cir. 2006). Next, the
court must determine if there exist “alternative means of exercising the right that
remain open to prison inmates.” Id. The court then considers the potential impact
of the desired accommodation on the prison staff and other prisoners “and on the
allocation of prison resources generally.” Id. Finally, the court must look at the
“existence of obvious, easy alternatives” which can serve as “evidence that the
regulation is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response.’” Id.; Lovelace, 472
F.3d at 200.
While it may be that the Red Onion Officials had some reason to implement
a policy of requiring the presentation of physical objects representing one’s faith,
the other factors, and particularly, the third and fourth Turner factors weigh
heavily against Defendants. Defendants had many easy alternatives such as
verifying past observation of the Ramadan fast or simply accepting the documents
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that Wall offered, such as the state court judgment showing Wall had lost his
belongings. Additionally, allowing an individual with a sincerely held religious
belief the opportunity to actively participate in the dietary observation of that faith
along on the same schedule as many other inmates would not negatively impact
staff, other prisoners or prison resources in any significant way.
Furthermore, the Red Onion Officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.
To determine eligibility for qualified immunity, the court must determine whether
a right was clearly established and that an objectively reasonable officer would
know the action taken to be unlawful. The establishment of the right to participate
in Ramadan is clear and is not questioned by Defendants. Under this Court’s
precedent, an objectively reasonable officer should have known that requiring only
physical tokens of an inmate’s faith was not sufficient justification to deny Wall
his right to participate in Ramadan. Therefore, for all these reasons, as discussed
in further detail below, this Court should reverse the District Court’s ruling and
remand the case for further proceedings.
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ARGUMENT
I.

UPON WALL’S RETURN TO RED ONION, WALL’S REQUEST
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE RAMADAN POLICY
WAS NO LONGER MOOT
Wall’s move back to Red Onion makes his claim for equitable relief

justiciable once again, regardless of the fact that in the interim time, Red Onion
may have changed its Ramadan policy. Under the mootness doctrine “federal
courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246
(1971). Thus, the doctrine prevents courts from hearing cases where a decision
would not affect the parties, either positively or negatively. De Funis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974). The District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to
Wall’s claim for equitable relief is a question of law this Court reviews de novo.
See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011). A grant of summary
judgment is only appropriate “if taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ‘no material
facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id., (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Applying this only in its most general terms, the district court stated that
even if Wall were transferred back to Red Onion, his request for equitable relief
would be mooted, because Red Onion voluntarily ceased the policy in question.
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JA142 n.12. However, in cases of voluntarily cessation, Supreme Court and
Fourth Circuit precedent require a much deeper analysis. In United States v. W. T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953), the Supreme Court held that in cases
regarding the voluntary cessation of a policy, the defendant bears the burden to
establish “that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.”
The Court reaffirmed this thirteen years ago, explaining that “[t]he heavy burden of
persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to
start up again lies with the party asserting mootness.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quotations omitted); see also
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800-801 (4th Cir. 2001)
(referring to the burden on defendants as “heavy” and finding that the defendants
did not meet that burden). This standard prevents the government from changing
its policy in order to moot litigation while leaving open the opportunity to change
the policy back after proceedings conclude.
To overcome this heavy burden, the Red Onion Officials must establish that,
“(1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the
alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” County of Los Angeles
v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979). Defendants must show both that there is no
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reasonable expectation that the misconduct or violation will happen again, and that
intervening events have completely eliminated the violation’s effects. Id.
Defendants presented no evidence sufficient to support a finding mootness.
Defendants cannot, therefore, meet their burden to prove that there is no reasonable
expectation of recurrence. Under this Court’s precedent, this first prong is fulfilled
when the person affected has been removed from the situation, Simmons v. Marsh,
917 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that since the plaintiff voluntarily resigned
from her job with the offending company, the case was moot), when the program
that caused the violation is discontinued overall, Jones v. Poindexter, 903 F.2d
1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the illegal execution of a state court
judgment was unlikely to happen again), or when the state has tacitly conceded
that the statute or rule being enforced is unconstitutional, and has stopped
enforcing it, Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1230-1231
(4th Cir. 1989). In all of these cases there is some substantial evidence or reason to
believe that the alleged violation will not recur; however, none of this evidence is
present in this case.
If fact, the Red Onion Officials do not present any evidence in this case that
the policy has been rescinded or is no longer in effect. The district court garners
information about a potential policy change from another case altogether. JA142
n.12 (citing DePaola v. Wade, No. 7:11–cv–00198, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340,
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*7-*10 (W.D.V.A. Mar. 30, 2012)). In that case, the court stated that the Virginia
Department of Corrections created a memo in response to a request for
clarification of their policy, explaining that the Department would no longer
require inmates to show sincere religious belief through their possession of
religious items. DePaola, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340 at *7. Noticeably absent
from DePaola is any indication as to the reason for the shift in department policy.
Nothing filed by the Defendants in this case clarifies that point further. Without
any indication of why the policy was abrogated and nothing to indicate that it will
not be reenacted apart from a statement found in DePaolo that the possession of
religious items in no longer required, the Red Onion Officials have fallen well
short of meeting their “heavy burden.” There is nothing beyond a statement in
another case that the policy is not currently in effect. This does nothing to provide
a reasonable expectation that the policy will be reinstated in the future. As the
Red Onion Officials have not alleged facts necessary to meet their heavy burden,
the district court’s finding of mootness should be reversed, and Wall’s claim for
equitable relief be allowed to proceed.
The District Court referred in passing to one decision of this Court which
stated that the “voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply where there is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated,” Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507
F.3d 281, 288 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). However, the facts of Incumaa
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differ significantly from the facts here. In Incumaa, a prisoner was placed into the
Maximum Security Unit because of bad behavior. Id. at 282. The Maximum
Security Unit in the prison did not allow prison inmates access to written materials
through the mails. The prisoner sued, claiming this violated his First Amendment
rights. Id. By the time the case was appealed, he was no longer in the Maximum
Security Unit. Id. The panel in that case found the case moot because it was
unlikely the prisoner was removed from Maximum Security in anticipation of
litigation, as he was removed for cessation of bad behavior, and that this
circumstance is “is not the kind of ‘voluntary cessation’ that the exception covers.”
Id. at 288. Incumaa is clearly distinguished from Wall’s circumstances because
participation in Ramadan is not dependent on Wall’s disciplinary record and it is
highly likely, not unlikely, that Wall will observe in Ramadan in the future.
Participation in a yearly religious practice will most assuredly come again, and
Wall’s participation in Ramadan is not tied to anything other than his sincere
adherence to the Muslim faith. Therefore, the narrow exception found in Incumaa
does not apply here.
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RED ONION’S RAMADAN POLICY VIOLATED THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A.

The Policy Burdened Wall’s Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs.

“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their
authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide
relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids the adoption of laws
designed to suppress religious beliefs or practices.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239
F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 2001). This protection extends into the prison context. Id.
To be entitled to summary judgment, the defendants had to establish that there was
no issue of material fact as to whether they violated a clearly established right
belonging to Wall. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 197-99 (4th Cir. 2006); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (when considering a
motion for summary judgment the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). Analysis of whether
the Red Onion violated Wall’s right to free exercise begins with the question of
whether Red Onion substantially burdened Wall’s sincerely held religious belief.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981). If the Court determines that Wall was substantially burdened, the Court
must then consider whether the policy is reasonably related to penological
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concerns under the four factors first articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987).
Determining sincerity of belief is a question of fact. United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (stating, within the conscientious objector framework,
that the “threshold question of sincerity” is “of course, a matter of fact”).
“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
One does not need to participate in all aspects of a religion in order for their belief
to be sincere. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Religious
observances need not be uniform to merit the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
Wall’s Nation of Islam faith is sincerely held as demonstrated by his past
successful participation in Ramadan, his inclusion in the Common Fare program,
and his repeated requests to participate in Ramadan during the time at issue. See
JA138-39. Defendants argued that Wall is not sincere simply because he had an
opportunity to request new items of his faith after the originals were lost but failed
to do so. JA78. However, this argument, like the Ramadan policy itself, attempts
to place some additional burden on Wall to obtain specific physical objects to
demonstrate his faith and ignores this Court’s precedent on what can constitute
sincerity. More specifically, the participation in one aspect of a religion should not
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be contingent on participation in one other aspect. Dettmer, 799 F.2d at 932. Even
if Wall chose not to have any physical items pertaining to his faith, rather than
simply losing them, the Red Onion Officials could not assume he was insincere in
his faith. Neither prison administrators nor courts may make blanket assumptions
“that lack of sincerity (or religiosity) with respect to one practice of a given
religion means lack of sincerity with respect to others.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 188.
A substantial burden is an action that “put[s] substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. at 187 (citing
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718). As the District Court noted here, Wall “[f]aced with
starvation and repeated sanctions for trying to eat during the night, plaintiff ate
during the day and violated his religious belief.” JA139. Furthermore, the Red
Onion Officials conceded that the policy imposed a substantial burden on Wall’s
faith. JA78. Red Onion’s strict Ramadan policy forced Wall to choose between
the tenets of his faith and his very survival. JA139. Thus, the policy clearly
imposed a substantial burden on Wall’s religious exercise and, therefore it must
meet the four Turner factors to be constitutionally permissible.
B.

Red Onion’s Policy On Its Face Is Not Reasonable Under The
Turner Factors.

While the district court cites the Turner factors, it does not actually apply
them. Instead, it moves on to state that the Red Onion Officials are entitled to
qualified immunity because “reasonable officials under the circumstances . . .
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would not have understood that their conduct of asking for evidence of religious
sincerity violated the First Amendment.” JA145. That misses the issue. There is
no prohibition on asking for evidence of sincerity, but given the fact that the
Turner factors are clearly established law, no reasonable officials would pursue
such evidence in a way that obviously violates them. And to the extent that Red
Onion Officials violated Wall’s rights as addressed by the Turner factors, they are
liable for their failure to adhere to the constitutional requirements laid out by the
Supreme Court.
Applying the Turner factors, a court first asks “whether there is a ‘valid,
rational connection’ between the prison regulation . . . and the interest asserted by
the government.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200. Second, it asks if there exist
“alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Finally, the Court looks at the desired accommodation and
determines (1) “what impact the desired accommodation would have on security
staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources” and (2) “whether there exist
any ‘obvious, easy alternatives’ to the challenged regulation or action.” Lovelace,
472 F.3d at 200 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-92).
There may be some connection between asking for physical items as proof
of an inmate’s faith and reducing the cost associated with accommodating certain
religious practices. Such a policy will eliminate those—and any associated costs—
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who have sincere religious beliefs but for whatever reason do not possess or
maintain physical items demonstrating their specific faith. This is even more true
at Red Onion where prisoners are severely limited in the alternative means
available to them to outwardly demonstrate their religious practice. Specifically,
because of the level of security at Red Onion, inmates may not participate in group
religious services. JA138 n. 3; JA74. Inmates only have access to religious
services on closed circuit television. JA75. Thus, regardless of how devout Wall
might be, the Red Onion Officials chose to ignore the few outward and obvious
manifestations of Wall’s faith to prohibit him from observing Ramadan.
The third and fourth Turner factors—the impact of the desired
accommodation would have and whether there exist any obvious, easy
alternatives—are very revealing here and weigh heavily against the Red Onion
Officials. On these two factors Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir.
1991), is instructive. In Mosier, a prisoner requested an exemption from the
prison’s grooming code due to his Native American beliefs. Id. at 1522-23.
Several levels of prison officials denied his request because he did not have
outside, nonfamily references vouching for the sincerity of his belief. Id. at 1523.
The Tenth Circuit expressed its concern that “[t]he prison’s policy of denying the
sincerity of a prisoner’s religious beliefs unless he submits reputable nonfamily
references vouching for sincerity represents a very limited approach to this
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question of fact [sincerity of belief].” Id. at 1527. The Mosier Court further stated
that “[w]hile there may be a logical connection between the policy and the likely
goal of insuring that exemptions reflect sincere beliefs, it is not clear if the policy
accommodates [the] personal nature of belief and the primacy of personal
statements and conduct.” Id. The Court also questioned whether “the alternative
suggested by plaintiff, consideration of his sincerity evidence without the outside
references, could accommodate him at de minimis cost to the penological
objectives of the prison.” Id. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded stating “we think that [the]
plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact about the reasonableness of the
exemption policy and its application.” Id.
Likewise, in the instant case, the requested accommodation is an obvious
and easy alternative. The Red Onion Officials argue that “there is no other
alternative” to their policy of “requir[ing] Muslim offenders to produce Islamic
materials when requested to demonstrate sincerity of belief.” JA76. In fact,
however, Red Onion’s own guidance document says nothing about requiring
physical Islamic items as proof of an inmate’s faith. Instead, it provides several
alternatives to Red Onion’s policy including “[Nation of Islam] services at
previous assignments, or past Ramadan/Month of Fasting involvement.” JA88.
Wall presented the Red Onion Officials with documents and evidence tending to
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prove the sincerity of his faith, however, these were repeatedly ignored and
dismissed. JA29, JA138-39. The Red Onion Officials had alternatives to their
unnecessarily strict policy—which their own guidance documents identified—yet
they refused to employ these obvious and easy alternatives to consider Wall’s
sincerity of belief.
Furthermore, these accommodations would not inconvenience prison staff,
inmates, or overly burden their resources. The Red Onion Officials stated that “if
[RED ONION] were to permit Ramadan participation by all [RED ONION]
offenders who simply signed up for Ramadan, it would have a significant and
burdensome impact on prison resources and staff.” JA76. The Red Onion
Officials mischaracterize the accommodation that Wall requests. Far from arguing
that Red Onion should allow anyone to participate in Ramadan who simply signs
up, regardless of sincerity, Wall argues that he should have been allowed to
participate because he sufficiently proved his sincerity. See e.g. JA32.1 However,
because of the incredibly narrow parameters set on what constitutes sincere faith
set by the Red Onion Official, only accepting physical objects establishing ones
faith, Wall was precluded from observing Ramadan according to his sincere
beliefs. Simply accepting any or all of Wall’s ample proof—evidence of lost

1

While Wall’s pleadings may not be expertly drafted, “however inartfully
pleaded . . . we hold [the pro se plaintiff] to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
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belongings, participating in common fare, evidence of his past participation in
Ramadan—in line with their own guidance documents, would result in no more
than a nominal additional burden on staff, inmates, or prison resources beyond the
hundreds of other inmates who were allowed to observe Ramadan.
C.

The Prison Officials’ Application Of The Ramadan Policy Was
Not Reasonable Under The Turner Factors.

On an as applied challenge, as with the Act, the First Amendment only
punishes intentional conduct. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 201. Otherwise, the actions of
prison officials are held to the same Turner standard as the policy itself. Id. at 200.
As with the analysis of the policy on its face, discussed above, the actions of the
Red Onion Officials were not reasonable under the Turner factors. Their refusal to
accept Wall’s proof that he was sincere in his faith when it was an easy and
obvious alternative to their overly restrictive policy would not burden staff,
inmates, or prison resources. Furthermore, as established in above, Wall pled
sufficient facts such that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the prison
officials acted intentionally in depriving Wall of his First Amendment rights.
Neither the District Court nor the Red Onion Officials in their motion for
summary judgment considered whether Red Onion’s Ramadan policy violated the
First Amendment as applied. Such an oversight was error. Furthermore, the
court’s grant of summary judgment was inappropriate on the First Amendment
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claim because of the significant factual dispute as to whether Rowlette and Wade
acted intentionally in precluding Wall from participating in Ramadan. JA140.
D.

Red Onion Prison Officials Are Not Entitled to Qualified
Immunity.

Qualified immunity is designed to protect government officials “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 817 (1982) (internal quotation marks and cites omitted). Considering
qualified immunity on summary judgment, courts first look to whether the facts,
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that Red Onion officials
violated Wall’s constitutional or statutory rights. Id.; see also Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 255 (all inferences to be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor at the summary
judgment stage). Courts also determine whether the right was “clearly established,”
such that “[t]he unlawfulness of the action [was] apparent when assessed from the
perspective of an objectively reasonable official charged with knowledge of
established law.” Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir. 1990). “The fact
that an exact right allegedly violated has not earlier been specifically recognized by
any court does not prevent a determination that it was nevertheless “clearly
established” for qualified immunity purposes.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307,
314 (4th Cir. 1992). Instead, a clearly established right may be one that is
“manifestly included within more general applications of the core constitutional
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principle invoked.” Id. Appellate courts review decisions on qualified immunity
de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).
As discussed above, Wall pled facts establishing a constitutional violation
under the Free Exercise Clause. Wall also pled sufficient facts to allow a
reasonable fact-finder to decide that the Red Onion Officials acted intentionally in
depriving Wall of his right to participate in Ramadan and thus supports an as
applied challenge. Wall’s right to participate in Ramadan was clearly established
as Fourth Circuit has stated, “[u]nder both the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA
in its most elemental form, a prisoner has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet
consistent with his . . . religious scruples,’ including proper food during Ramadan.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198-99 (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d
Cir. 2003)). Furthermore, “[a] prison official violates this clearly established right
if he intentionally and without sufficient justification denies an inmate his
religiously mandated diet.” Id. at 199.
A reasonable prison official would also have known that requiring physical
items and only physical items as proof of an inmate’s faith was not sufficient
justification for denying Wall’s right to participate in Ramadan. This Court has
held that failure to follow one aspect of a religion cannot be the sole metric for
determining whether an inmate is sincere enough to engage in other aspects.
Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Religious observances
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need not be uniform to merit the protection of the first amendment.”); see also
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.”). Moreover, there is evidence that the Red Onion Officials may have
intentionally misrepresented conversations with Wall concerning his desire to
participate in Ramadan. JA140.
The district court stated that Red Onion officials are entitled to qualified
immunity because “reasonable officials under the circumstances existing at the
[Red Onion] in 2010 would not have understood that their conduct of asking for
evidence of religious sincerity violated the First Amendment.” JA145. However,
the district court mischaracterizes Wall’s claim as attacking Red Onion’s ability to
ask for some evidence of religious sincerity. On the contrary, Wall argues that Red
Onion’s policy and its application are simply too restrictive on what inmates can
use to prove their faith, requiring specific evidence of religious sincerity.
Red Onion’s applied policy set a high threshold for proving sincerity, as it
excluded even a devout inmate with (1) a recorded history of observing Ramadan,
(2) prior approval for a special diet to accommodate his faith, and (3) evidence that
his belongings, including his religious belongings, were lost by the prison system
itself. The Red Onion Officials applied their policy in such a way that failure to
follow one practice (possessing a Quran or prayer rug) is used to preclude the
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inmate from engaging in another practice (fasting during Ramadan). Then the Red
Onion Officials mischaracterized Wall’s statement to make it appear as if he,
himself elected not to participate. This is clearly established as impermissible
under Fourth Circuit case law and any reasonable officer would have known such
actions were impermissible. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 188 (“Such an inmate’s
right to religious exercise is substantially burdened by a policy, like the one here,
that automatically assumes that lack of sincerity (or religiosity) with respect to one
practice means lack of sincerity with respect to others.”). Therefore, defendants
were not entitled to summary judgment on either the question of mootness or their
qualified immunity and the trial court ruling should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in defendants’ favor should be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
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